2449 Ť CASE NO.: CR-FP-95-6248 2013 DEC 13 PM 1:51 2 DEPT. NO.: I ELKO CO DISTRICT COURT 3 4 5 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 6 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA. THE STATE OF NEVADA'S: Plaintiff. 9 1. PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS MATTER: AND 10 11 A. DECLARATION BY THE STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE 12 **CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH** 13 **ENGENDER THIS COMPROMISE** 14 2. REQUEST FOR THE CONDUCT OF 15 AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WITH **RESPECT THERETO, INCLUDING:** VS. 16 17 A. THE CONDUCT OF EITHER A **SETTING HEARING OR** 18 **CONFERENCE WITH THE COURT TO** 19 **INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERT WITNESSES WHOM THE** 20 STATE INTENDS TO CALL IN **CONNECTION WITH THIS PROFFER:** 21 22 4. JOINT REQUEST BY THE PARTIES FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER 23 **VACATING THE CURRENT TRIAL DATE** 24 PENDING THE CONDUCT OF THE

PATRICK CODY McCORMICK.

Defendant.

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5. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

HEREIN: AND

EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUESTED

COMES NOW THE STATE OF NEVADA, the Plaintiff in the aboveentitled cause, by and through its Counsel Of Record the Elko County District
Attorney's Office, and by this Pleading would proffer to the above-entitled Court for its
review and consideration the No-Contest Plea Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit
1 which, as the Court can discern, has been executed by the Parties.

Declaration Of The State Concerning The Circumstances Which Have Engendered This Compromise

Jacob Jones (hereinafter simply "Jacob) the decedent child identified in the Criminal Information pending this matter died on the 9th day of June, 1995.

On the 13th day of June, 1995, an autopsy was performed on Jacob at the Washoe County Coroner's Office by a Hospital Pathologist, one Frederick A. Laubscher, who never testified in the matter, who concluded that the ultimate cause of Jacob's death was:

Multiple traumatic injuries with bilateral subdural hematoas

- 2. A Complaint was filed on the 22nd day of June, 1995 charging Mr. McCormick with First Degree Murder; a preliminary hearing was conducted on the 18th day of August 1995; and he was bound over for trial;
- 3. On the 28th of August, 1995, a Criminal Information was filed;
- A trial was conducted between the 26th of February 1996, and 1st of March,
 1996 and Mr. McCormick was convicted of First Degree Murder;
- A Judgment Of Conviction was entered on the 23rd day of April, 1996, and Mr.
 McCormick was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole;

6.

- After the denial of a direct appeal a Post-Conviction Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter the "Petition") was litigated; denied at the District Court level; and then appealed by the Defendant to the Nevada Supreme Court.
 - a. The primary thrust of the Petition was that Mr. McCormick's trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert to explore the possibility that Jacob died from anaphylaxis as a result of a anaphylactic reaction to the administration of penicillin to him on the morning of the 9th of June, 1995, under circumstances wherein he had been diagnosed on the 1st of January, 1995, to have had an acute allergic reaction to penicillin, in the form of the drug Amoxicilin, which had been prescribed for him on the 29th day of December, 1994.

It was adduced at the Trial of this matter that:

- 7. On the morning of the 9th of June, 1995, Jacob Jones' mother, Ms. Jennifer Jones, because Jacob had had a cold for several days, at, she maintains, Mr. McCormick's suggestion, quartered a penicillin pill that had been previously prescribed for her, crushed at least some part of it up, and administered it to Jacob.
 - a. Ms. Jones was aware of the fact that Jacob had been diagnosed in January of 1995 to have previously had an allergic reaction to amoxicillin a form of penicillin.

See T.T., Vol. II, P. 13, L, to P. 16, L. 16)

8. Thereafter:

- a. Ms. Jones then put Jacob Jones down for a nap, and proceeded to Ms. Jennifer Jones' Grandmother, Joyce Lingafelter's residence who at the time was residing at a Residence situated at # 5, Yorkshire Villa in Carlin Nevada Lingafelter's Residence to retrieve Chucky Jacob's sibling leaving the Defendant in the Hamilton Street Residence alone with Jacob.
- b. Ms. Jones was gone for approximately fifteen minutes;
- Upon her return the Defendant told Ms. Jones that Jacob did not look well,
 and that something was wrong with him;
- d. Ms. Jones then proceeded into the bedroom where she had laid Jacob down and found that he was not breathing – or at least that there was something seriously wrong with him.
- e. She reported at the time, and during her testimony in the preliminary hearing in this matter and at trial that she picked Jacob up and shook him and lightly slapped his face in an effort to revive him unsuccessfully.
- f. Being unsuccessful in her efforts she ultimately ran out into the front room; Mr. McCormick's brother Tom McCormick, who was an EMT, was summoned from his residence on Bush Street in Carlin who arrived and started performing CPR and the like on Jacob;
- g. An ambulance was summoned, and Jacob was transported to the then

Elko General Hospital (hereinafter the "Hospital") where he arrived at approximately 12:20 p.m. and extraordinary life-saving efforts were undertaken by the Emergency Room Physician Dr. Robert Stefanko and Staff.

- h. Eventually efforts to revive Jacob proved unsuccessful and Dr. Emmalina G. Cortez, the Pediatrician who attended Jacob on the 9th day of June, 1995, at the Hospital pronounced Jacob as deceased at 8:20 p.m. on Friday the 9th of June, 1995, and life support was terminated.
- 9. Dr. Robert J. Stefanko who was the emergency room physician who treated

 Jacob upon his arrival at the Elko General Hospital on the June 9th, 1995 recited

 in his Discharge Summary the following:
 - a. On Page 3 under the Heading "Medical Decision Making" Dr. Stefanko observed that:

The patient sustained an acute cardiopulmonary arrest, probably secondary to an acute respiratory arrest and acute allergic etiology from penicillin would be suspected...

- b. On Page 4 of the Summary under the Heading "Diagnosis" Dr. Stefanko recited:
 - Acute respiratory and cardiopulmonary arrest with successful resuscitation, however, cannot rule out permanent central nervous system/cerebral sequela.
 - 2. Rule out acute allergic reaction to penicillin causing number one.
 - 3. Rule out child abuse.

4. Multiple contusions to the face and right forearm.

The State believes that what Dr. Stefanko intended to convey by the words:

Rule out acute allergic reaction to penicillin causing number one.

was that there need to be further forensic investigation of the issue of whether or not Jacob was suffering from anaphylaxis at the time he was brought to the hospital on the 9th day of June, 1995.

- At the time Jacob's presentation to the Hospital on June 9th, 1995, a CT Scan (which can no longer be located i.e. the scan itself) of Jacob was conducted which did not according to the Radiologist who performed it, Murad Haid, M.D. disclose any evidence of intracranial hemorrhage and was interpreted as "normal" by Emmalina Dr. Cortez the Pediatrician who attended Jacob at the Hospital on the 9th of June, 1995.
- 10. On the 4th day of November, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court entered an Order reversing the District Court's denial of Mr. McCormick's Post-Conviction Petition holding that:

Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the victim died from anaphylactic shock due to an allergic reaction to penicillin. The record before this court indicates that counsel was deficient and that appellant was prejudiced by that deficiency. Counsel testified that he knew the emergency room physician could not rule out a penicillin allergy as a cause of death; that he could not recall discussing it with Dr. S. Dunton, the medical expert with whom he briefly consulted; and that he would have presented expert testimony that the victim died of anaphylactic shock had he had such an expert opinion. Counsel provided no reason for why he did not investigate this possible defense. It was thus objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to have abandoned the potential defense without first investigating it. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

Moreover, appellant has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel presented expert testimony regarding a penicillin allergy.

- 11. Mr. McCormick, having been incarcerated for some 17.25 years, was returned to the Elko County Jail from the Nevada State Prison; on the 4th day of February, 2013, the Court again set bail at \$100,000.00 which was posted and the matter was set for trial for the 28th day of January, 2014.
- 12. Subsequent to the reversal of this matter by the Nevada Supreme Court the State engaged the service of one Bennet I. Omalu, a preeminent Clinical, Anatomic, and Forensic Pathologist, who is also a Neuropathologist, and Epidemiologist to review this case. Dr. Omalu after thoroughly reviewing the case, including slides which were preserved from Jacob's autopsy on the 15th day of July, 1995, issued a comprehensive twenty-nine (29) page summary of his findings. Dr. Omalu's observations and conclusions included the following:
 - a. First:

Review of the submitted hospital and medical records confirms that **NO** definitive clinical laboratory test was performed on Jacob Jones. Anaphylaxis was neither confirmed nor excluded; however anaphylaxis remained a potent differential diagnosis especially given the temporal relationship and association between the exposure and administration of Penicillin, and onset of the symptoms of acute cardiopulmonary arrest, pulmonary edema and loss of consciousness. The following clinical laboratory tests are typically performed on blood samples [plasma] to confirm the diagnosis of anaphylaxis, viz:

- 1. Total Immunoglobulin E [IgE]
- 2. Allergen specific IgE [in this instance penicillin specific IgE]
- 3. Histamine
- 4. Tryptase
- 5. Chymase
- 6. Carboxypeptidase A3

None of these tests was performed before Jacob Jones died. Although they were not performed pre-mortem, these tests should have also been performed post-mortem either on a hospital admission blood sample or an autopsy blood sample, yet none of these tests was performed after the autopsy. These tests should have been performed in light of the prevailing forensic scenario with Penicillin Anaphylaxis as a potent and highly plausible underlying cause of death or contributory factor to death.

b. Second:

... In summary therefore, a fatal anaphylactic reaction to Penicillin remains a likely underlying cause of death of Jacob Jones, especially in light of the negative tissue immunohistochemistry for APP, which will be described below ...

... Review of the autopsy pictures did not reveal any extensive and/or confluent subcutaneous and/or subgaleal hemorrhages of the scalp. There were no skull fractures. The next medico-legal question that arises, therefore, would be: What is the forensic significance of the intracranial hemorrhages described on Jacob Jones in relation to causation of death? The prevailing technological tool we may adopt to address this question would be Amyloid Precursor Protein [APP] tissue immunohistochemistry to determine the degree of diffuse traumatic axonal injury, if present. APP is a large transmembrane protein that exists in the neurons and axons [nerve fibers] in the brain and spinal cord. In a brain without injury, APP immunohistochemistry is negative. In a brain with traumatic axonal injury APP immunohistochemistry becomes progressively positive as the post-injury time increases. APP immunohistochemistry becomes positive after about one to three hours following injury sustenance and is a marker of severe

traumatic brain injury.

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The APP immunopositive pattern for traumatic brain injury comprises multifocal APP-immunopositive axonal bulbs, axonal spheroids and swollen, distorted axonal forms. This specified pattern was absent in the archival histologic sections of Jacob Jones' brain and spinal cord except only in the nerve fiber layer of the neuroretina in the right and left eyeballs, adjacent to the optic papilla, and accentuated in the right eyeball. APP immunohistochemistry was therefore negative in the brain, spinal cord and optic nerves in this case. This additional finding further suggests that severe traumatic brain injury may not be the underlying cause or mechanism of death. Thefocal immunopositive pattern observed in the nerve fiber layer of the neuroretina, adjacent to the optic papilla, would be consistent with secondary focal axonal injury of the neuroretina due to congestive brain swelling and raised intracranial pressure, which can follow any type of brain injury including hypoxic-ischemic cerebral injury of any etiology.

In my practice I have encountered cases whereby APP immunohistochemistry was negative in the brain of infants in spite of traumatic brain injury given the cellular immaturity of the infantile brain. However within the context of the prevailing forensic scenario in this case, negative APP immunohistochemistry is yet another feature that may further undermine the validity of the cause of death as has been determined by the coroner.

APP immunohistochemistry was performed on the tissue histology slides of the brain, which were taken and archived by Dr. Laubscher, the pathologist, who performed the autopsy. Unfortunately, the brain sections, which were taken are not the standard sections, which are recommended for the evaluation of the human brain for traumatic brain injury. These sections were grossly inadequate and did not include vital topographically targeted regions of the brain that are selectively vulnerable to traumatic axonal injury. The absence of these topographically selective regions of the brain for APP immunohistochemistry even further undermines the validity of the autopsy brain analysis and evaluation for the presence or absence of traumatic brain injury, and the assessment of the severity of the traumatic brain injury.

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There is a mismatch between the CT scan of the head upon hospital admission and the autopsy findings after death. The CT scan of the head was negative and did not show any intracranial hemorrhages. Autopsy showed bilateral subdural hemorrhages. Could the intracranial hemorrhages have occurred between the hospital admission and death, and/or autopsy? Could all or some of the intracranial hemorrhages have been artifactual aberrations of medical/surgical therapy or an artifactual aberration of the autopsy prosection? Furthermore the histomorphologic and topographic pattern of selective cerebral neuronal excitotoxic injury in this case, is inconsistent with severe traumatic brain injury, severe traumatic axonal or vascular injury. Rather it is consistent with cerebral hypoxic-ischemic neuronal injury, which is seen in acute cardiopulmonary arrest, which Jacob Jones was diagnosed with. His acute cardiopulmonary arrest was thought to be caused by acute anaphylactic reaction to penicillin.

Hypothetically, if the suspected perpetrator in this case instigated the terminal chain of events by inflicting adult-induced nonaccidental trauma on Jacob Jones on or before June 9. 1995. there are prevailing repeated breaches of the contiguity of this alleged chain of events by novel factors, which would have successfully impeached or nullified such an alleged child-abusive event as the underlying cause of death. These novel factors, which may have successfully breached the contiguity of the alleged child abusive chain of events include sepsis, DIC, penicillin anaphylaxis and shaking by the mother. These novel factors synergistically initiated novel and terminal chains of events, which precipitated death. The clinical management, death investigation and autopsy in this case did not successfully identify, recognize, inculpate or exculpate these novel factors as probable underlying causes of, and contributory factors to death within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

- 13. On the 28th of August, 2013, Dr. Ellen Clark who testified as the State's Pathologist at the Defendant's Trial was interviewed via-a-vis Dr. Omalu's findings.
 - a. Dr. Ellen Clark, maintains that it is her opinion that the autopsy photographs created in connection with the autopsy disclose that

Jacob suffered from significant blunt force trauma to his head and brain that that was ultimately the cause of his death.

- However Dr. Clark acknowledges that Dr. Omalu is correct in observing
 that:
 - There were forensic tests that could have been performed on Jacob's bodily fluids that would have identified the presence of anaphylaxis, if it was present, or excluded it;
 - That such tests were not performed; and
 - That such tests cannot now be performed because the bodily fluids necessary to do so were not preserved.

Given these circumstances the State has concluded that in the face of the Defendant's willingness to resolve this matter as contemplated by the Plea Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 1 that the matter should not be re-tried as a First Degree Murder case, and has compromised this matter as described in that Agreement for those reasons.

Dated this 13 day of Dec., 2013.

MARK TORVINEN

State Bar Number: 551

Elko County District Attorney

Counsel For The Plaintiff

Request For The Conduct Of An Evidentiary Hearing With Respect To The Proposed Compromise Of This Matter

comes now the state of Nevada, the Plaintiff in the aboveentitled cause, by and through its Counsel of Record the Elko County District
Attorney's Office, and moves that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing with
respect to the issue of the compromise of this matter at which the State can present
the testimony of Dr. Omalu, and Dr. Clark (the latter in all likelihood by telephone or if
it can be arranged audio/visual presentation via skype).

Estimate Of Time Needed For Hearing

The State would estimate that such an Hearing would take no more than two (2) hours and would ask that the Court set two (2) hours aside for such a hearing.

Request For A Setting Hearing Or Conference To Insure The Availability Of These Experts

Further the State requests that the Court:

- 1. If it grants the request of Counsel to vacate the current trial date (see below) that it set an evidentiary hearing to be conducted during the week of the 27th Of January, 2014, to the 1st of February, 2014, or the week February 4th, 2014 to the 7th of February, 2014, when the Trial was originally set to commence, and Dr. Omalu, and Dr. Clark are already scheduled to appear; or
- 2. That the Court, if it is disinclined to set such a hearing during the week of the 27th Of January, 2014, to the 1st of February, 2014, or the week February 4th, 2014 to the 7th of February, 2014, that it either conduct a setting hearing to set

such an evidentiary hearing, or a telephone conference with Counsel for the Parties so that the State can insure the availability of Dr. Omalu and Dr. Clark for the conduct of such a hearing.

Dated this 13° day of, 0 < c. 20 13.

MARK TORVINEN

State Bar Number: 551

Elko County District Attorney

Elko County District Attorney's Office

Counsel For The Plaintiff

Joint Request By Counsel For The Parties For An Order Vacating The Current Trial Date

comes now the state of Nevada, the Plaintiff in the aboveentitled cause, by and through its Counsel Of Record the Elko County District
Attorney's Office, and Patrick Cody McCormick, by and through his Counsel Of
Record Mr. David Lockie of the Law Firm of Lockie & Macfarlan, who by their
respective signatures hereunder do hereby jointly request that the Court enter an
Order vacating the current Jury Trial currently scheduled to commence on January
28th, 2014, and:

- 1. Either set an Evidentiary Hearing with respect to the compromise contemplated in this matter to be conducted during the week of the 27th Of January, 2014, to the 1st of February, 2014, when the Trial was originally set to commence; or
- 2. That the Court by a formal setting hearing or telephone conference(s) with

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Counsel for the Parties set such a hearing so that the State can insure the availability of, and arrange for the presence of Dr. Omalu and Dr. Clark at said Hearing.

Dated this 13 th day of, Dec. 2013.

MARK TORVINEN

State Bar Number: 551

Elkó County District Attorney

Elko County District Attorney's Office

Counsel For The Plaintiff

Dated this $13^{1/4}$ day of, Deur 20/3.

DAVID B. LOCKIE

State Bar Number: 2384

Counsel For The Defendant

Submission Of Proposed Order Vacating Trial Date

COMES NOW THE STATE OF NEVADA, the Plaintiff in the above-

entitled cause, by and through its Counsel Of Record the Elko County District

Attorney's Office, and in connection with the:

PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS MATTER; set forth above, would submit to the Court for its consideration an:

ORDER:

VACATING TRIAL DATE PURSUANT TO A JOINT REQUEST OF THE PARTIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE:

1 PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS MATTER: 2 3 FILED HEREIN BY THE STATE: 4 a proposed version of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, and an original of which 5 has been delivered to the Clerk Of Court for transmittal to the Court for its 7 consideration. Dated this 13 day of, Dec. 8 9 10 11 MARK TORVINEN 12 State Bar Number: 551 Elko County District Attorney 13 Elko County District Attorney's Office 14 Counsel For The Plaintiff 15 **Certificate Of Service** 16 , hereby certify that I am an 17 18 employee of the Elko County District Attorney's Office, and that on the 13th day of 19 December 2013, a true and correct copy (or true and correct copies in the 20 21 case of multiple addressees) of the foregoing; 22 THE STATE OF NEVADA'S: 23 1. PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS 24 MATTER: AND 25 A. DECLARATION BY THE STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE 26 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ENGENDER THIS COMPROMISE 27 2. REQUEST FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 28 WITH RESPECT THERETO, INCLUDING:

A. THE CONDUCT OF EITHER A SETTING HEARING OR CONFERENCE WITH THE COURT TO INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERT WITNESSES WHOM THE STATE INTENDS TO CALL IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROFFER;

4. JOINT REQUEST BY THE PARTIES FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER VACATING THE CURRENT TRIAL DATE PENDING THE CONDUCT OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUESTED HEREIN; AND

5. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

was/were served upon the addressee(s) identified hereafter in the following manner:

That a copy was delivered to the Chambers of the above-entitled Court at the following address:

The Honorable Nancy Porter
District Court – Dept. 1
Elko County Court House
Elko, Nevada. 89801

That a second copy was either delivered to Lockie & Macfarlan via the front desk of the Elko County District Attorney's Office, or mailed by first class mail, postage pre-paid to the following address:

Lockie & Macfarlan 1919 Idaho Street Elko, Nevada 89801

Signature Of Person

Executing Certificate Of Service

EXHIBIT 1 TO THE PROFFER OF A PLEA AGREEMENT IN STATE VS. PATRICK CODY McCORMICK DISTRICT COURT CASE NUMBER: CR-FP-95-6248

CASE NO.: CR-FP-95-6248

DEPT. NO.: I

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff.

1. STATUTORY NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT

VS.

AND

PATRICK CODY McCORMICK.

Defendant.

2. WRITTEN OFFER OF PROOF IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONTEMPLATED PLEA OF NO CONTEST

The Statutory No Contest Agreement

entitled cause, by and through its Counsel of Record, the Elko County District

Attorney's Office, and the Defendant above-named, *in proper person*, and by and through his Counsel Of Record, the Elko Nevada Law Firm of Lockie & Macfarlan appearing in the personality of David B. Lockie, who by their respective signatures hereunder, do hereby declare to the above-entitled Court that the Parties have settled upon a negotiated disposition of the Criminal Prosecution pending against the Defendant in the above-entitled cause, which compromise is comprised of the

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following terms:

Count 1:

Recitation Of The Parties' Intent

It is the intent of the Parties in executing this Agreement to provide for the complete resolution of the prosecution pending against the Defendant in the aboveentitled cause wherein the Defendant is charged, in a Criminal Information filed in the above-entitled cause on the 28th day of August, 1995 with:

> Open Murder (Including First Degree Murder And All Lesser Included Offenses), A Felony As Defined By NRS 200.010, NRS 200.020. NRS 200.030. And NRS 200.033

I Patrick Cody McCormick first declare, by my signature hereunder that this Agreement represents the entire agreement between me and the State of Nevada, and no other promises, other than those set forth and memorialized in this Agreement have been made to me in connection with the compromise of the charges pending against me in the above-entitled cause, as described in the Criminal Information filed herein.

With the above declaration in mind:

THE DEFENDANT'S SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT

1. The Defendant will enter a plea of no contest to Amended Criminal Information filed in District Court pursuant to the terms of this Plea Agreement charging the Defendant with:

> Involuntary Manslaughter, A Category D Felony As Defined By NRS 200.070, And NRS 200.090;

hereinafter referred to in the remainder of this Agreement simply as Involuntary Manslaughter.

The Defendant by his signature on this Agreement acknowledges that he has been advised that a plea of "no contest" will be treated by the sentencing Court, for the purposes of the resolution of this criminal prosecution, as the functional equivalent of a plea of guilty – that is the Court, if it concludes to accept the plea(s) of no contest contemplated by this Agreement will use that/those plea(s) to:

- Convict the Defendant of the offense(s) to which a plea or pleas of no contest are entered; and
- To enter judgment in the case based upon that/those plea(s) of no contest.

Further, the Parties, by their signatures upon this Agreement do hereby waive the attachment of a copy of said Criminal Information to this Agreement.

2. Further, the Defendant agrees that by his signature on this Agreement he is waving any right he may have otherwise had to make application for diversion under the provisions of NRS 453.3363, or Chapter 458 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, or to apply for participation in Drug Court.

THE STATE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT

- 1. The State agrees that:
 - a. The proffer by the Defendant of the plea(s) of no contest contemplated by this Agreement to Involuntary Manslaughter;
 - b. The District Court's acceptance of that/those Plea(s); and
 - c. The entry of Judgment convicting the Defendant of Involuntary Manslaughter;

shall be deemed a complete resolution of any and all criminal liability which the Defendant may have had arising out of the events which gave rise to the prosecution now pending against the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and shall constitute a bar to prosecution with respect to any other theory of criminal liability which may have been pleaded against the Defendant in connection the events resulting in this prosecution.

a. In that regard, it is agreed by and between the Parties that the bar to

prosecution created by this Agreement shall extend only to the events which gave rise to the instant prosecution, and it is not intended to extend to, nor does it encompass any other criminal liability which the Defendant may have, if any, based on events unconnected to the specific offenses at issue in this prosecution and the events and facts upon which it is premised.

 Finally the State agrees that the Defendant's faithful performance of the terms of this Agreement shall constitute a bar to its right, if any it had, to pursue an allegation of habitual criminality in connection with this criminal prosecution.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO SENTENCING

It is agreed that at the time of sentencing the Parties will jointly recommend that the Court impose the following sentence:

- 1. That the Defendant be sentenced to a period of nineteen (19) to fortyeight months in the Nevada State Prison;
- 2. That the Defendant be given credit against said sentence for the time previous served under that certain Judgment Of Conviction entered and filed in the above-entitled matter on the 23rd day of April, 1996, until the his release from the Elko County Jail on Bond on the 4th day of February, 2013, after reversal of his aforementioned Judgment Of Conviction by the Nevada Supreme Court on the 14th day of November, 2012 a period of some two-hundred and seven (207) months that is approximately 17.25 years;
- 3. That no fine be imposed;
- 4. That Judgment be entered against the Defendant upon his plea of no contest to Involuntary Manslaughter; and
- 5. That the Defendant be discharged from any obligation to further appear in this matter.
- 6. The parties would by their respective signatures on this Agreement that in so far as they are aware there is no outstanding issue of restitution in this matter.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA

I Patrick Cody McCormick, declare that I understand that at the time I enter my aforementioned plea(s) of no contest that in order for the above-entitled Court to accept the plea(s) of no contest contemplated by this Agreement, acknowledge my understanding of the elements of the offense(s) I have agreed to plead no contest to. The elements of the offense of Involuntary Manslaughter are as follows:

- That the Defendant committed an unlawful act or acts;
- 2. Which resulted in the killing of a human being without any intent on the part of the Defendant to do so.

Recitation Of The Maximum Permissible Penalty

I understand and have been advised that as a consequence of the plea(s) of no contest contemplated by this Agreement that:

- I may be imprisoned in the Nevada State Prison for a period of up to forty-eight
 (48) months (that is four [4] years); and
- Further that a fine of up to five-thousand dollars (\$5,000.00) may be imposed upon me.

I have been further advised that the law requires the imposition of an administrative assessment fee in connection with the entry of judgment in a felony or gross misdemeanor case.

I understand that I will be eligible for probation upon conviction of the offense(s) I intend to plead no contest to. I understand that except as otherwise

provided by Statute, the question of whether or not I am placed upon probation will be entirely up to the discretion of the above-entitled Court.

Restitution

I understand that if applicable in the case, and deemed appropriate by the Court I may be ordered to make restitution to the victim of the offense to which I propose to plead no contest, and to the victim of any related offenses which is/are being dismissed or with respect to which prosecution has been declined pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

Additional Terms Of The Agreement

I understand that I will also be ordered to reimburse the State of Nevada for any expenses incurred, if any there be, in connection with my extradition to the State of Nevada in connection with this prosecution.

I have been advised and understand that if more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed and I am eligible to serve the sentence concurrently with any other sentence imposed or which I am already serving, that it will be up to the Sentencing Judge to determine, in the Court's discretion, whether such sentences are to be served consecutively, that is one after the other, or concurrently, that is at the same time.

I have not been promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone. I know that my sentence is to be determined by the Court within the limits prescribed by the statute(s) under which I propose to plead no contest. I understand

 that at the time sentence is imposed that if the State of Nevada or my Lawyer recommend any specific sentence to the Court, the Court is not obliged to accept that/those recommendation(s).

I understand that with respect to the offense(s) I intend to plead no contest to the Division of Parole And Probation of the Department Public Safety will prepare a Pre-Sentence Report for the above-entitled Court. This report will include matters relevant to the issue of sentencing, including my criminal history. I understand that this Report may contain hearsay information regarding my background and criminal history. My Lawyer and I will each have the opportunity to comment on the information contained in the Report at the time sentence is imposed.

THE DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF HIS/HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLEA OF NO CONTEST CONTEMPLATED BY THIS AGREEMENT

I Patrick Cody McCormick declare that I have been advised and understand that in order for the above-entitled Court to accept the plea(s) of no contest I propose to enter in this matter that I will have to waive my constitutional rights in this matter, and I declare by my signature on this Agreement that I am willing to give up the following constitutional rights and privileges in order that the Court could accept my plea(s) of no contest:

1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, including the right to decline to testify at trial, in which event the State would not be allowed to comment to the jury about my decision not to testify. I understand that my plea(s) of no contest will

require my waiver of this right to the following extent: the Court in connection with my plea(s) of no contest may require me, in order to accept my plea(s), to personally verbally enter my plea(s) of no contest, and may require me to either;

- a. Provide a factual basis for my plea that is a brief description of the events which gave rise to the prosecution against me and my participation in them which has given rise to my contemplated plea(s) of no contest; or
- b. To acknowledge the factual accuracy, relative to potential evidence arrayed against me, of the Offer Of Proof set forth hereafter, and that after reviewing the same I have concluded that I may be convicted, again, of the greater offense or offenses I am charged with or could be charged with, and have entered the my plea of no contest, in the light of the evidence potentially arrayed against me, as described in the Offer of Proof set forth hereafter, me to avoid that result; and
- c. Further that I believe entering the plea of no contest contemplated by this Agreement is in my best interests, and that standing upon my right to stand trial with respect to the greater offense or offenses I am, or could be charged with is not in my best interests¹.

I further understand that other than the requirement that I personally verbally enter my plea(s) of no contest, and that, upon the Court's request, I provide a

See North Carolina vs. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 1970 U.S. Lexis 3 (1970), and its progeny including State vs. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473 (1996)

factual basis for my plea(s), or acknowledge, as more fully described above, the factual accuracy of the Offer Of Proof set forth hereafter, and acknowledge the implications thereof as described above, that my right not to incriminate myself will still pertain in these matters, and that I may not otherwise be required to speak or provide any other information wherein to do so might further incriminate me.

- 2. The constitutional right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury with respect to the charges originally pending against me, free of excessive pre-trial publicity prejudicial to my ability to present a defense, at which trial I would be entitled to the assistance of a Lawyer, hired by me, or appointed for me if I was unable to hire an Attorney. At trial the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of all of the offenses I was originally charged with, and the elements of that/those offense(s) to which I am proposing by the terms of this Agreement to plead no contest.
- 3. The constitutional right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who have testified against me at trail.
- The constitutional right to subpoena witnesses to testify on my behalf.
- 5. The constitutional right to testify in my own defense, or, if it be my decision after consultation with my Lawyer, to decline to testify at trial.
- 6. The right to appeal any conviction I suffered at trial, with the assistance of a Lawyer, again either hired by me, or appointed to represent me in the event I was unable to hire my own Lawyer, unless the appeal is based upon reasonable

constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds which challenge the legality of the proceedings, and except as otherwise provided by NRS 174.035.

I Patrick Cody McCormick by my signature on this Agreement, and subject to the above-entitled Court's acceptance of my contemplated plea(s) of no contest, do hereby waive the above-described constitutional rights.

VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA

I further acknowledge I have discussed the elements of all of the original charges which were pending against me, and the elements of the offense(s) I proposed to plead no contest to with my Lawyer, and I understand the nature of the charge(s) originally pleaded against me, and the charge(s) I propose to plead no contest to.

I understand that the State, should I have exercised my right to have a trial with respect to the original charge(s) pleaded against me, would have been required to prove each element of each charge(s) pending against me beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, the State, but for my contemplated plea(s) would have been required to prove each and every element of the offense(s) I propose to plead no contest to beyond a reasonable doubt.

I have discussed with my Lawyer the possible defenses which might have been available to me at trial in connection with this matter, and the circumstances which might reflect in my favor.

I did before deciding to sign this Agreement, discuss to my satisfaction

with my Lawyer all of the foregoing elements and the nature of the charges; the consequences of my proposed plea(s) of no contest; the constitutional rights I would have been able to exercise if I had had a trial; and the waiver of rights which would be required in order for the above-entitled Court to accept my contemplated plea(s) of no contest. Additionally, I was afforded an opportunity to ask my Lawyer any questions I had concerning these matters and my questions, if any I had, were answered to my satisfaction.

I believe after considering the matter, and consulting with my Lawyer with respect to this matter, that entering into, and carrying out this Agreement by entering the plea(s) of no contest called for by it is, and remains in my best interests, and that exercising my right to have a trial would have been, and remains contrary to my best interests.

I am signing this Agreement voluntarily, after consultation with my Lawyer, and I am not acting under duress or coercion, or by any promise of leniency other than those which are set forth and described in this written Agreement.

I am not now under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or any other drug which would in any manner impair my ability to comprehend or understand this.

My Lawyer prior to my execution of this Agreement had answered all of my questions concerning my contemplated plea(s) of no contest, and has answered all of my questions, if any I had, regarding this Agreement and its

consequences to my satisfaction and I am satisfied with the services of my Lawyer, and the advice he has rendered to me in connection with this matter.

THE DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE BLOCK

Dated this 11 th day of December 2013

PATRICK CODY McCORMICK

Defendant In Proper Person

THE STATE'S SIGNATURE BLOCK

Dated this 13 day of <u>Dec.</u>, 20 13.

MARK TORVINEN
Deputy District Attorney
State Bar Number 551
Elko County District
Attorney's Office

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT

I, the undersigned, as Counsel Of Record for the Defendant abovenamed, and as an Officer of the Court, by my signature hereunder, certify to the above-entitled Court as follows:

1. That before the Defendant executed this Agreement, I had fully explained to the Defendant the elements of the offense(s) with which he/she was originally charged,

and the elements of the offense(s) to which he/she proposes to plead no contest.

- 2. I advised the Defendant of the potential penalties for each of the offense(s) with which he/she was originally charged, and the potential penalties for the offense(s) to which he/she proposes to plead no contest. Further I advised the Defendant with respect to, and concerning the restitution, if any there be, that the Defendant may be ordered to pay in connection with the imposition of sentence in this matter.
- 3. The plea(s) of no contest which the Defendant proposes to enter in this matter pursuant to the terms of this Agreement are consistent with all of the facts known to me concerning this case, and will be entered in accordance my advice to the Defendant. Further I believe that the compromise reflected in this Agreement, is in the Defendant's best interests.
- 4. To the best of my knowledge and belief, at the time the Defendant executed this Agreement he/she:
 - a. Was competent, and understood the elements of the offense to which he/she proposes to plead no contest, and the consequences, including the potential penalties which could be imposed upon the Defendant, in connection with said plea(s) of no contest;
 - b. That he/she executed this Agreement voluntarily; and
 - c. Was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance,

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or other drug at the time of his/her execution of this Agreement.

Dated this 13th day of December 20 13.

DAVID B. LOCKIE Lockie & Macfarlan

Counsel For The Defendant

Offer Of Proof In Support Of The No Contest Plea Contemplated By This Agreement

comes now the state of Nevada by and through its Counsel of Record the Elko County District Attorney's Office, and by this pleading would make the following Offer of Proof with respect to the prospective evidence in this matter which the State believes and therefore avers it would have been in a position to adduce should the Defendant have elected to go to trial upon the original charges pleaded against him/her in this matter:

- 1. As of the 9th day of June, 1995, the Defendant and one Jennifer Jones, and Ms. Jones two minor children, Jacob Jones (DOB: April 13th, 1994) hereafter simply "Jacob", and a older half sibling Charles (Chucky) Rankin (hereinafter "Chucky") resided at a residence in Carlin, Nevada located 420 Hamilton Street in Carlin, Nevada;
- 2. On the morning of Friday June 9th, 1995, the Defendant, Ms. Jones and Jacob were at the Carlin Hamilton Street Residence.
 - a. Chucky was at the home of Ms. Jennifer Jones' Grandmother, Joyce

Lingafelter who at the time was residing at a Residence situated at # 5,

Yorkshire Villa in Carlin Nevada – which was within walking distance of the

Defendant's and Ms. Jone's Hamilton Street Residence in Carlin.

- 2. In the late morning some time around 11:00 o'clock a.m. on the morning of Friday June 9th, 1995, Jacob had been sick for approximately three days.
 - a. Ms. Jones, who knew that Jacob had been diagnosed with an allergic reaction to penicillin (in the form of Amoxicillin) in January of 1995, crushed one-quarter of a 250 milligram Veetids pill an adult form of penicillin which had been prescribed for Ms. Jones by a Dr. Pemberton who was then practicing in Spring Creek, Nevada and administered it to Jacob by crushing it up and spooning it into Jacob's mouth with a spoon and water.
 - Ms. Jones then put Jacob Jones down for a nap, and proceeded to Ms.
 Lingafelter's Residence to retrieve Chucky leaving the Defendant in the
 Hamilton Street Residence alone with Jacob.
- 3. Ms. Jones was gone for approximately fifteen minutes;
- 4. Upon her return the Defendant told Ms. Jones that Jacob did not look well, and that something was wrong with him;
- 5. Ms. Jones then proceeded into the bedroom where she had laid Jacob down and found that he was not breathing.
 - a. She reported at the time, and during her testimony in the preliminary hearing in this matter and at trial that she picked Jacob up and shook him

and lightly slapped his face in an effort to revive him – unsuccessfully.

- 6. Being unsuccessful in her efforts she ultimately ran out into the front room; Mr. McCormick's brother Tom McCormick, who was an EMT, was summoned from his residence on Bush Street who arrived and started performing CPR and the like on Jacob;
- 7. An ambulance was summoned, and Jacob was transported to the then Elko General Hospital (hereinafter the "Hospital") where he arrived at approximately 12:20 p.m. and extraordinary life-saving efforts were undertaken by the Emergency Room Physician Dr. Robert Stefanko and Staff.
 - Eventually efforts to revive Jacob proved unsuccessful and Dr. Emmalina
 G. Cortez pronounced Jacob as deceased at 8:20 p.m. on Friday the
 9th of June, 1995, and life support was terminated.
- 8. Dr. Stefanko's June 9th, 1995 Discharge Summary contained the following recitations:
 - a. On Page 3 under the Heading "Medical Decision Making" Dr. Stefanko observed that:

The patient sustained an acute cardiopulmonary arrest, probably secondary to an acute respiratory arrest and acute allergic etiology from penicillin would be suspected...

- b. On Page 4 of the Summary under the Heading "Diagnosis" Dr. Stefanko recited:
 - 1. Acute respiratory and cardiopulmonary arrest with successful

resuscitation, however, cannot rule out permanent central nervous system/cerebral sequela.

- 2. Rule out acute allergic reaction to penicillin causing number one.
- 3. Rule out child abuse.
- 4. Multiple contusions to the face and right forearm.
- 9. At the time Jacob's presentation to the Hospital on June 9th, 1995, a CT Scan (which can no longer be located i.e. the scan itself) of Jacob was conducted which did not according to the Radiologist who performed it, Murad Haid, M.D. disclose any evidence of intracranial hemorrhage and was interpreted as "normal" by Dr. Cortez.
- 10. Both Jennifer Jones and Patrick McCormick were interviewed at the Hospital on the afternoon or in the early evening of June 9th, 1995, by then Detective Connie Bauer of the Elko Police Department.
 - a. Ms. Jones related to her that:
 - On June 9th, 1995, Jacob had been sick for several days; they did not have insurance, and her ex-husband complained when she took the children to the hospital or a physician.
 - 2. She had some adult penicillin pills which had been prescribed for her and she quartered one of them; crushed one quarter of one of the pills and administered it to Jacob in a teaspoon of water.
 - 3. She laid Jacob down in a bedroom and left to retrieve her other son

- and was only gone for a few minutes. Mr. McCormick was in the Residence when she left.
- Upon her return Mr. McCormick advised her that Jacob did not look very well, and there was something wrong with him.
- 5. She walked into the bedroom and discovered that Jacob was not breathing she grabbed him and shook him in an effort to revive him, unsuccessfully, and then went to the front room and summoned Mr. McCormick's brother who is was a EMT who came to the residence and commenced performing CPR on Jacob and then she called an ambulance.
- Ouring her conversation with Det. Bauer Ms. Jones related that she was aware of the fact that Jacob was allergic to penicillin; had, while awaiting arrival of the ambulance, observed a red rash on his chest; and had interpreted his distress as an allergic reaction to penicillin.
 - a. In an interview of Ms. Jones conducted on the 14th of June, 1995, by P.K. O'Neill of the Nevada Division of Investigation Ms. Jones asserted that the idea of administering penicillin to Jacob on the morning of June 9th, 1995, had originated with Mr. McComick. Specifically she asserted that:

O'Neill: So you sa

So you sat him down you went and did your couple of items, Mr. McCormick was up at this time?

 Jones:

Yeah, he was still awake, he was doing bills, he

had that day (skip)

Jones:

He asked if I still had the penicillin pills, I said yes and he (skip) we should try to give him some. (skip) a large dosage and I didn't think nothing of it. Ok, that was the one thing, I didn't think anything of it. Ok, you know, maybe it won't hurt him, maybe it will help him (skip) not even the whole pill (skip) we- cut it up so that it was in so it was a half of a pill and then another half and then we took a part of of that half and we smashed it up and Cody put water in it and I gave it to Jacob. I didn't force it down him

O'Neill:

In a cup or ..

Jones:

No, on a spoon, on a spoon, and I held his, I opened his mouth because he wouldn't take his

medicine, he had a hard time with that ...

... O'Neill:

That's before you left for your mothers.

Jones:

That - was before I left to go get Chuckie

b. Mr. McCormick related the following to Det. Bauer at the Hospital on

the 9th of June, 1995, as recited in her June 11th, 1995, Report:

I asked Cody what had happened today, and he related the following: he works for Coke Selve Products, on the graveyard shift. He arrived home form work on this day about 0730 hrs. He sat down at the kitchen table and was working on bills. Jennifer told him the baby was sick. (Cody said the baby had been sick for 2 to 3 days) She told Cody that she was going to give the baby some of her penicillan pills. Cody emphasized that he did not do this, he just saw Jennifer do it. She took one of her penicillan pills and broke it up in some water. She placed this in a spoon and gave it to Jacob. She then laid Jacob in the bedroom, and left to get Chucky (the 2 yr. old boy) Cody said this was about 1130 hrs. He was still sitting at the kitchen table, working on bills. He heard Jacob was still crying, so he went into the bedroom. Jacob was "away from his blanket and his bottle". Cody said Jacob was attached to his blanket, and he thought this was one reason for the baby crying. He gave

Jacob his blanket, and walked into the kitchen and filled the bottle with water. When he walked back into the bedroom, Jacob had quit crying. He noticed that Jacob "did not look good". When I asked him to explain this, Cody said his eyes were open and they "looked white", "like his (Jacob's) eyes had rolled back in his head". He had also stopped breathing.

This was when Jennifer came home. He told Jennifer that Jacob might have something wrong with him. Jennifer went into the bedroom. Jacob" gasped, then blew out". He then quit breathing. Jennifer was now holding the baby. Cody put his hand over the baby's mouth, and there was "no breath". Jennifer grabbed Jacob and ran into the livingroom. She was trying to do CPR on Jacob. Cody said he told Jennifer to call his brother, which she did, and as his brother just lives across the street, the brother was at their house before Jennifer could hang up the phone. As his brother started CPR, he told Jennifer to call for the ambulance, which she did, and Jacob was transported to Elko.

When I asked Cody how Jacob was crying, Cody said, "you know, he was fussing a little when Jennifer left. He quit fussing, then started again". Cody said this was when he went into the baby's room.

- 10. An autopsy was performed on Jacob's remains on the 13th day of June, 1995, by one Frederick A. Laubscher, M.D. a Hospital Pathologist who listed his Diagnoses as follows:
 - 1. Subdural hemorrhage, bilateral, recent
 - 2. Scalp hemorrhages, recent, involving frontal, parietal and occipital areas
 - 3. Outer periosteal skull hemorrhages, small, recent
 - 4. Leptomeningeal brain hemorrhages, multiple, focal, recent
 - 5. Cauda equina area hemorrhage, recent

- 6. Optic nerve sheath hemorrhages, bilateral, recent
- Dural hemorrhage adjacent to thoracic spinal cord, focal, recent
- Soft tissue hemorrhage adjacent to spinal cord, lumbar region
- 9. Splenic hemorrhages, multiple, recent
- 10. Superficial laceration, right infra-orbital area, recent
- 11. Healing abrasions, right frontal and left frontal areas, small
- 12. Subcutaneous hemorrhages, recent, focal, lower thoracic and lumbar areas of back (three)
- 13. Subcutaneous hemorrhage, posterior knee area, left, recent
- 14. Cutaneous rash, head, neck and thoracic areas
- 15. Alleged Penicillin allergy (clinical diagnosis)
- 16. Respiratory infection, recent (clinical diagnosis)
- a. Dr. Laubscher characterized the cause of death as follows:
 - 1. Multiple traumatic injuries with bilateral subdural hematomas.
- b. Dr. Laubscher never testified in any of the proceedings undertaken with respect to the original trial proceedings in this matter.
- 11. It was Dr. Ellen Clark, a forensic pathologist, who testified in this matter both at the preliminary and at trial.
 - a. At preliminary hearing, conducted on the 18th of August, 1995,

Dr. Clark opined that after reviewing Dr. Laubscher's Report and reviewing the autopsy photographs, and slides she had come to the conclusion that Jacob:

- 1. "... [D]ied of multiple brain injuries due to blunt force trauma..." (P.H.T., P. 33, L's 21 to 22);
- 2. That there may have been as many as 15 to 20 separate impact injuries (P.H.T., P. 49, L' s13 to 16); and
- 3. Finally that Jacob has sustained a majority of these injuries within 6 to 12 hours of his presentation at the Hospital on the 9th of June, 1995. (P.H.T., P. 59, L's 21 to 22)
- b. Between the time of the conduct of the Preliminary Hearing and Trial, particularly as of the 28th day of February, 1996, Dr. Clark changed her opinion about the lapse of time between the infliction of injury on Jacob, and the on-set of extremis. Specifically on the 28th day of February, 1996, Dr. Clark disclosed it was her opinion that Jacob had suffered "... shearing or rotational whiplash injury to the brain..." and would have been in extremis and in the process of expiring within minutes of the infliction of the traumatic injury to Jacob's brain she testified the autopsy revealed. (Trial Transcript, Vol. III, P.

71, L. 23; and P. 167, L. 24 to P. 168, L. 18) to P. 73, L. 4.

12. Subsequent to the reversal of this matter by the Nevada Supreme
Court the State engaged the service of one Bennet I. Omalu, a
preeminent Clinical, Anatomic, and Forensic Pathologist, who is also
a Neuropathologist, and Epidemiologist to review this case. Dr.
Omalu after thoroughly reviewing the case, including slides which
were preserved from Jacob's autopsy on the 15th day of July, 2013,
issued a comprehensive twenty-nine (29) page summary of his
findings. Dr. Omalu's observations and conclusions included the
following:

a. First:

Review of the submitted hospital and medical records confirms that **NO** definitive clinical laboratory test was performed on Jacob Jones. Anaphylaxis was neither confirmed nor excluded; however anaphylaxis remained a potent differential diagnosis especially given the temporal relationship and association between the exposure and administration of Penicillin, and onset of the symptoms of acute cardiopulmonary arrest, pulmonary edema and loss of consciousness. The following clinical laboratory tests are typically performed on blood samples [plasma] to confirm the diagnosis of anaphylaxis, viz:

- 1. Total Immunoglobulin E [IgE]
- 2. Allergen specific IgE [in this instance penicillin specific IgE]
- 3. Histamine

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- 4. Tryptase
- 5. Chymase
- 6. Carboxypeptidase A3

None of these tests was performed before Jacob Jones died. Although they were not performed pre-mortem, these tests should have also been performed post-mortem either on a hospital admission blood sample or an autopsy blood sample, yet none of these tests was performed after the autopsy. These tests should have been performed in light of the prevailing forensic scenario with Penicillin Anaphylaxis as a potent and highly plausible underlying cause of death or contributory factor to death.

b. Second:

- ... In summary therefore, a fatal anaphylactic reaction to Penicillin remains a likely underlying cause of death of Jacob Jones, especially in light of the negative tissue immunohistochemistry for APP, which will be described below ...
- ... Review of the autopsy pictures did not reveal any extensive and/or confluent subcutaneous and/or subgaleal hemorrhages of the scalp. There were no skull fractures. The next medico-legal question that arises, therefore, would be: What is the forensic significance of the intracranial hemorrhages described on Jacob Jones in relation to causation of death? The prevailing technological tool we may adopt to address this question would be Amyloid Precursor Protein [APP] tissue immunohistochemistry to determine the degree of diffuse traumatic axonal injury, if present. APP is a large transmembrane protein that exists in the neurons and axons [nerve fibers] in the brain and spinal cord. In a brain without injury, APP immunohistochemistry is negative. In a brain with traumatic axonal injury APP immunohistochemistry becomes progressively positive as the post-injury time increases. APP immunohistochemistry becomes positive after about one to three hours following injury sustenance and is a marker of severe traumatic brain injury.
- The APP immunopositive pattern for traumatic brain injury comprises multifocal APP-immunopositive axonal bulbs, axonal spheroids and swollen, distorted axonal forms. This specified pattern was absent in the archival histologic sections of Jacob

Jones' brain and spinal cord except only in the nerve fiber layer of the neuroretina in the right and left eyeballs, adjacent to the optic papilla, and accentuated in the right eyeball. APP immunohistochemistry was therefore negative in the brain, spinal cord and optic nerves in this case. This additional finding further suggests that severe traumatic brain injury may not be the underlying cause or mechanism of death. Thefocal immunopositive pattern observed in the nerve fiber layer of the neuroretina, adjacent to the optic papilla, would be consistent with secondary focal axonal injury of the neuroretina due to congestive brain swelling and raised intracranial pressure, which can follow any type of brain injury including hypoxic-ischemic cerebral injury of any etiology.

In my practice I have encountered cases whereby APP immunohistochemistry was negative in the brain of infants in spite of traumatic brain injury given the cellular immaturity of the infantile brain. However within the context of the prevailing forensic scenario in this case, negative APP immunohistochemistry is yet another feature that may further undermine the validity of the cause of death as has been determined by the coroner.

APP immunohistochemistry was performed on the tissue histology slides of the brain, which were taken and archived by Dr Laubscher, the pathologist, who performed the autopsy. Unfortunately, the brain sections, which were taken are not the standard sections, which are recommended for the evaluation of the human brain for traumatic brain injury. These sections were grossly inadequate and did not include vital topographically targeted regions of the brain that are selectively vulnerable to traumatic axonal injury. The absence of these topographically selective regions of the brain for APP immunohistochemistry even further undermines the validity of the autopsy brain analysis and evaluation for the presence or absence of traumatic brain injury, and the assessment of the severity of the traumatic brain injury.

There is a mismatch between the CT scan of the head upon hospital admission and the autopsy findings after death. The CT scan of the head was negative and did not show any intracranial hemorrhages. Autopsy showed bilateral subdural hemorrhages. Could the intracranial hemorrhages have occurred between the hospital admission and death, and/or autopsy? Could all or some of

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the intracranial hemorrhages have been artifactual aberrations of medical/surgical therapy or an artifactual aberration of the autopsy prosection? Furthermore the histomorphologic and topographic pattern of selective cerebral neuronal excitotoxic injury in this case, is inconsistent with severe traumatic brain injury, severe traumatic axonal or vascular injury. Rather it is consistent with cerebral hypoxic-ischemic neuronal injury, which is seen in acute cardiopulmonary arrest, which Jacob Jones was diagnosed with. His acute cardiopulmonary arrest was thought to be caused by acute anaphylactic reaction to penicillin.

Hypothetically, if the suspected perpetrator in this case instigated the terminal chain of events by inflicting adult-induced nonaccidental trauma on Jacob Jones on or before June 9, 1995, there are prevailing repeated breaches of the contiguity of this alleged chain of events by novel factors, which would have successfully impeached or nullified such an alleged child-abusive event as the underlying cause of death. These novel factors, which may have successfully breached the contiguity of the alleged child abusive chain of events include sepsis, DIC, penicillin anaphylaxis and shaking by the mother. These novel factors synergistically initiated novel and terminal chains of events, which precipitated death. The clinical management, death investigation and autopsy in this case did not successfully identify, recognize, inculpate or exculpate these novel factors as probable underlying causes of, and contributory factors to death within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

- On the 28th of August, 2013, Dr. Ellen Clark was interviewed via-a-vis Dr.
 Omalu's findings.
 - a. Dr. Clark, while conceding that there were tests on bodily fluids that could either have identified or excluded anaphylaxis, which cannot now be performed because the bodily fluids were not preserved, still maintains that it is her opinion that the autopsy photographs created in connection with the autopsy disclose that Jacob suffered from significant

blunt force trauma to his head and brain that that was ultimately the cause of his death.

The above represents a summary of the potential evidence available with respect to this matter at this point in time.

Dated this ________, 20_13.

MARK TORVINEN
State Bar Number: 551
Elko District Attorney
Counsel For The Plaintiff

EXHIBIT 2 TO THE PROFFER OF A PLEA AGREEMENT IN STATE VS. PATRICK CODY McCORMICK DISTRICT COURT CASE NUMBER: CR-FP-95-6248

1 CASE NO.: CR-FP-95-6248 2 DEPT. NUMBER: I 3 4 5 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 6 OF THE STATE OF NEVADA. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELKO 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 9 Plaintiff. **ORDER:** 10 VACATING TRIAL DATE PURSUANT 11 TO A JOINT REQUEST OF THE VS. 12 PARTIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE: 13 14 PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS PATRICK CODY McCORMICK, 15 MATTER: Defendant. 16 FILED HEREIN BY THE STATE 17 18 19 THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED IN CHAMBERS that certain: 20 JOINT REQUEST BY THE PARTIES FOR THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER 21 VACATING THE CURRENT TRIAL DATE PENDING THE CONDUCT OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUESTED HEREIN; 22 23 contained within that certain; 24 PROFFER OF A NO CONTEST PLEA AGREEMENT IN THIS MATTER: 25 hereinafter the "Proffer" filed by the State of Nevada herein, and good cause 26 27 appearing therefore: 28

| 1 | IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Jury Trial current set to commence | | | | | |
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| 2 | in this matter on Tuesday January 28 th , 2014, be and the same is hereby vacated. | | | | | |
| 3 | IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court will conference with | | | | | |
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| 5 | Counsel for the Parties to set the Evidentiary Hearing requested in the above | | | | | |
| 7 | referenced Proffer to be conducted as soon as possible commensurate with insurir | | | | | |
| 8 | the availability of the Expert Witnesses whose testimony the State intends to adduc | | | | | |
| 9 | at said Hearing. | | | | | |
| 10 | Dated this day of, 20 | | | | | |
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| 13 | NANCY PORTER | | | | | |
| 14 | District Judge – Dept. I | | | | | |
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| 16 17 | Approval Of Form And Content Of Proposed Order | | | | | |
| 18 | COMES NOW THE STATE OF NEVADA, by and through the Elko | | | | | |
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| 20 | County District Attorney's Office, and Patrick Cody McCormick the Defendant above- | | | | | |
| 21 | named, by and through Counsel Of Record, David Lockie, who by their respective | | | | | |
| 22 | signatures hereunder do hereby signify to the above-entitled Court that they have | | | | | |
| 23 | reviewed the proposed Order set forth above, and approve the same for its | | | | | |
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| 1 | submission to the Court for its review and consideration thereof. | | | | |
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| 6 | | | MARK TÖRVINEN State Bar Number: 551 | | |
| 7 | | | Elko County District Attorney | | |
| 8 | | | Elko County District Attorney's Counsel For The Plaintiff | Office | |
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| 10 | | Dated this _ | day of, | .20 | |
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| 13 | | | DAVID B. LOCKIE | • | |
| 14 | | | State Bar Number: 2384 | | |
| 15 | | | Counsel For The Defendant | | |
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